Luz Paradoa v. Philadelphia Housing Authority by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-29-2015 
Luz Paradoa v. Philadelphia Housing Authority 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Luz Paradoa v. Philadelphia Housing Authority" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 428. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/428 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3191 
____________ 
 
LUZ PARADOA, 
 
                            Appellant 
  
v. 
  
PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY 
    
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 13-cv-06012) 
District Judge:  Hon. Timothy J. Savage 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 23, 2015 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 29, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is an employment discrimination action arising under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and under 
                                                          
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951, et seq.  
Luz Paradoa appeals the District Court’s order granting appellee Philadelphia Housing 
Authority’s (“PHA’s”) motion for summary judgment on all claims.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly 
summarize the facts relevant to our decision.  Paradoa joined PHA in 2000 as a property 
manager.  Appendix (“App.”) 104a.  In 2008, PHA promoted her to “Manager of the 
Community Partners Program,” which required her to oversee staff, manage budgets, and 
supervise contractors.  App. 105a-106a.  Six or seven staff members reported to Paradoa.  
App. 106a. 
 In 2010, Paradoa’s first cousin Angelique Martez joined PHA as a family self-
sufficiency counselor.  App. 183a-184a.  Martez noted on her application that she knew 
someone who worked at PHA, but she did not specifically disclose her relationship to 
Paradoa.  App. 185.  Paradoa was Martez’s supervisor until 2012.  App. 190a.   
 In 2012, three of Paradoa’s staff members filed Human Resources complaints 
accusing Paradoa of bullying them and showing favoritism toward Martez.  App. 529a-
530a.  Joanne Strauss, PHA’s director of Human Resources, reported that between seven 
and nine staff members complained to her about Paradoa, and at least four of them 
specifically complainted that Paradoa and Martez would speak together in Spanish and 
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laugh and point in ways that suggested they were making fun of other employees.  App. 
139a-140a.   
 PHA employment administrator Cheryl DeVose interviewed Paradoa regarding 
the complaints.  App. 149a.  Paradoa claims that DeVose asked her if she was Hispanic, 
if she spoke Spanish, and if she spoke Spanish at work or around her co-workers.  App. 
399a.  DeVose denies asking if Paradoa was Hispanic.  App. 155a.  Following her 
investigation, DeVose recommended to Joanne Strauss that Paradoa’s employment be 
terminated.  App. 154a. 
 Joanne Strauss determined that Paradoa’s conduct violated multiple PHA policies.  
First, PHA’s “Non-Fraternization Policy” prohibits employees from supervising those 
with whom they have a close relationship, and the policy’s definition of “close 
relationship” includes first cousins.  App. 248a.  Second, the Human Resources Policy 
Manual in effect from 1999 to 2012 – the period when Paradoa was employed – defined 
an employee’s direct supervision of a relative as a conflict of interest and charged 
supervisors to notify Human Resources whenever an assignment created such a conflict.  
App. 321a-322a.  Third, Section 5.2 of PHA’s Workplace Management Policy warns that 
bullying will result in discipline up to and including termination.  App. 266a.  As 
punishment for violating these policies, Strauss terminated Paradoa’s employment.  App. 
132a. 
 Paradoa responded by this lawsuit.  In March 2014, PHA moved for summary 
judgment.  The District Court granted that motion.  Paradoa timely appealed. 
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II.1 
 We review grants of summary judgment de novo.  Montone v. City of Jersey City, 
709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013).  Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine 
issues of material fact are presented, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).  We resolve all 
factual doubts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.  DL 
Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III. 
 Race discrimination claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the PHRA are, 
in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, subject to the burden-shifting 
framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  
Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999).  First, the plaintiff must 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.  Finally, should the defendant carry 
this burden, the plaintiff then must have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the defendant were 
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.  Id.   
 To establish a prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, and the PHRA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, 
                                                          
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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(2) she was qualified for the position she sought to attain or retain, (3) she suffered an 
adverse employment action, and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that could 
give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.  Mandel v. M & Q Packaging 
Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2013).  Only the final element is under dispute in this 
case. 
 Paradoa argues that two circumstances of her termination give rise to an inference 
of discrimination.  First, PHA has shown little evidence that Paradoa knew about and 
violated its anti-nepotism policies.  Second, DeVose asked during her investigation if 
Paradoa was Hispanic. 
 Even if these statements were true, they would not be sufficient evidence of 
discrimination to survive summary judgment.  PHA is not required to show evidence that 
it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Paradoa until after she has 
established her prima facie case.  If Paradoa could meet that burden by arguing her 
adversary had not produced its evidence yet, it would upend McDonnell Douglas’s 
burden-shifting framework.  Moreover, even positive evidence that PHA’s stated reason 
for firing Paradoa was a pretext would not be evidence that the real reason was 
discriminatory unless it was paired with some other evidence of racial bias – for example, 
evidence that non-Hispanic employees were treated differently or that Paradoa was the 
only Hispanic person on staff.   
 Paradoa has no such evidence here.  The record shows that DeVose was asking 
Paradoa about her use of the Spanish language because she was investigating claims that 
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Paradoa bullied her co-workers in Spanish.  See App. 139a-140a, 150a.  A further 
question about Paradoa’s nationality – as opposed to her language ability – might have 
been irrelevant, but it does not suggest racial animus.  See Takele v. Mayo Clinic, 576 
F.3d 834, 839 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding mere references to nationality did not suggest 
discriminatory animus without resorting to speculation).  “[S]peculations, generalities, 
and gut feelings, however genuine, when they are not supported by specific facts, do not 
allow for an inference of discrimination to be drawn.”  Adeniji v. Admin. for Child. 
Servs., 43 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (speculation not sufficient to withstand summary 
judgment). 
 Paradoa has failed to present evidence from which an inference of discrimination 
can be drawn and so cannot make out a prima facie case. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Philadelphia Housing Authority. 
